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Background
Th   e International Health Regulations (IHR[2005]) are a set 
of legally binding regulations for all World Health 
Organisation (WHO) Member States. Th   ey aim to harmo-
nise the protection of public health while avoiding 
unnecessary disruption of trade and travel through the 
development of eﬀ   ective global alert, surveillance and 
response strategies for all priority public health events. 
Th  e IHR(1969) were used by WHO Member States to 
guide international prevention and control of infectious 
diseases until June 2007. Th  e IHR(1969) obliged WHO 
Member States to notify the WHO of cholera, plague and 
yellow fever outbreaks in their territories. In addition, the 
IHR(1969) included requirements for health and vaccina-
tion certiﬁ  cates for travellers from infected to non-infected 
areas; deratting, disinfecting and disinsecting of ships and 
aircraft; as well as detailed health measures at airports and 
seaports in the territories of WHO Member States [1].
Rapid globalisation and the emergence of new diseases 
and hazards in the 21st century rendered the IHR(1969) 
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Public Healthinadequate to deal with the increased risk of international 
spread of public health risks and hazards. Contagious 
illnesses spread farther and faster than ever with the 
increase in plane traﬃ   c. New outbreaks of Ebola in Zaire 
[2] and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in China [3] 
and Marburg [4] emerged with implications for inter-
national travel and trade and required coordinated inter-
national response. Th   e IHR(1969) also wholly depended 
on the aﬀ  ected country to make an oﬃ   cial notiﬁ  cation to 
the WHO once cases were diagnosed and lacked mecha-
nisms to foster collaboration between the WHO and a 
country in which public health events with potential for 
international spread were occurring. Th   e IHR(1969) also 
lacked eﬀ  ective incentives to encourage compliance by 
Member States. Th   e limitations of the IHR(1969) there-
fore paved way for its revision to address the above-
mentioned gaps and provide real-time information to 
inform formulation of measures to prevent international 
disease spread. Th  e revised IHR(2005) was adopted by 
the 58th World Health Assembly on 23 May 2005 and 
entered into force on 15 June 2007 [5].
Uganda is using the WHO Africa Region Integrated 
Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) Strategy for 
the control of communicable diseases [6]. Th  e strategy 
promotes the integration of surveillance activities for 
priority conditions, taking advantage of common surveil-
lance and support functions at all levels. Uganda adopted 
the strategy in 2000 [7] and it is being used as the vehicle 
for implementing the IHR(2005) [8]. Article 5 and Annex 
1a of the IHR(2005) require countries to assess the ability 
of existing national structures, capacities, and resources 
to meet the minimum requirements for surveillance and 
response, within two years following the entry into force 
of these regulations. Th   is assessment is meant to inform 
the process of developing and implementing action plans 
to ensure that all the core capacity requirements for the 
IHR(2005) are established and maintained throughout 
the country. In line with this requirement, the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) Uganda, with support from the WHO, 
conducted an assessment of the core capacities required 
for implementation of the IHR(2005) during the period 
12 to 13 October 2009. Th  e purpose of the assessment 
was to obtain baseline information on the current status 
of IHR(2005) core capacities for all the ﬁ  ve hazards and 
at points of entry so as to facilitate the development of an 
action plan to guide the establishment and maintenance 
of the capacities in the country.
Uganda is located in East Africa and is bordered by 
Kenya to the East; Sudan to the North; Democratic 
Republic of Congo to the West; Tanzania to the South; 
and Rwanda to the Southwest. It has a population of 30 
million people with an area of 241,038 square kilometres, 
of which the land area covers 197,323 square kilometres. 
Th   ere are four physical regions, namely: Central, 
Western, Northern and Eastern. Th   e regions are divided 
into districts and at the time of the assessment, there 
were 80 districts in the country.
Methods
Preparation
We conducted a descriptive cross-sectional assessment 
using the protocol developed by the WHO for assessing 
national surveillance and response capacities for the 
IHR(2005) [9]. Th  e assessment was coordinated by the 
Ugandan National IHR Focal Point (NFP) with technical 
and logistical support from the WHO. Th   e assessment team 
included IHR(2005) stakeholders from national and district 
levels. A two-day pre-assessment workshop was held to 
examine the priorities and objectives, and adapt and pre-
test the assessment protocol and data collection tools.
Site selection
National
At the national level, a convenience sample of ﬁ  ve sectors 
were visited to assess the capacities for each of the ﬁ  ve 
IHR(2005) hazards. Th   e sectors included the Ministry of 
Health Headquarters and two national reference labora-
tories (Uganda Virus Research Institute and Central 
Public Health laboratory) for the infectious disease 
assessment; the Ministry of Agriculture Animal Industry 
and Fisheries and the Uganda Wild Life Authority for the 
zoonotic disease assessment; the Radiological Depart-
ment in Mulago hospital for the radio-nuclear assess-
ment; the National Drug Authority and the Uganda 
National Bureau of Standards for the food safety assess-
ment; the National Environment Management Authority 
for the chemical assessment; and Entebbe International 
Airport, Port Bell and Busia border post for the point of 
entry assessment. During the sectoral interviews, the 
hazard focal point oﬃ     cers or other technical oﬃ   cers 
identiﬁ   ed by the sectoral head were selected for 
administering the adapted assessment tool.
District
At the district level, a convenience sample of 13 (16%) 
districts were selected to assess the core capacity 
requirements for all the IHR(2005) hazards. In selecting 
the districts, we considered regional representation from 
all the four regions of Uganda, districts that are prone to 
disease outbreaks, and those with major points of entry. 
Th  e selected districts included Hoima, Busia, Tororo, 
Moyo, Ntungamo, Bushenyi, Kasese, Arua, Kampala, 
Mpigi, Wakiso, Bundibugyo, and Kitgum. In each of the 
selected districts, the assessment was conducted for the 
district health oﬃ   ce, one hospital or a Health Centre IV 
(HCIV), and three lower level health centres (2 HCIII and 
1 HCII). All the facilities were selected randomly using the 
raﬄ   e method in each of the participating districts.
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Th   e core capacities assessed for each of the ﬁ  ve 
IHR(2005) hazards (infectious, chemical, zoonoses, food 
safety, radio-nuclear) and points of entry included: 
national legislation and policy; coordination; surveillance; 
response; preparedness; risk communication; laboratory; 
and human resource capacity.
Data management and analyses
Data entry screens were developed to facilitate data entry 
using the Epi Info™ [10]. Th  e data were coded prior to 
entry and following the completion of data entry, the 
database was cleaned to facilitate the running of frequen-
cies to determine the level of core capacities for each of 
the ﬁ  ve IHR(2005) hazards. Frequency tables and charts 
were used to summarize the core capacity levels by 
hazard at national, district and health facility levels. Th  e 
qualitative analysis by way of strengths, weaknesses, 
oppor  tunities and threats was used for the interpretation 
of quantitative data.
Results
National legislation for the IHR(2005)
Th   e laws governing surveillance and response for infect-
ious diseases in Uganda were contained in the Public 
Health (PH) Act (CAP 281). Th  e PH Act provided for 
cross-border surveillance and the implementation of 
control measures during a PH emergency. Th  e Act 
mandated the Minister of Health to declare a disease 
notiﬁ  able. However, the list of notiﬁ  able diseases did not 
include several IHR(2005) notiﬁ  able conditions, such as 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), inﬂ  uenza 
caused by a new sub-type, and smallpox. Similarly, the 
list of notiﬁ   able diseases did not require mandatory 
notiﬁ   cation of chemical and radio-nuclear hazards by 
public health oﬃ   cers.
Th   e Animal Diseases Act (CAP 38) and the Rabies Act 
(CAP 44) provided for the notiﬁ  cation, surveillance and 
response to zoonotic events like brucellosis, anthrax, 
avian inﬂ  uenza and rabies. Th   e Wild Life Act (CAP 200) 
existed but did not provide for the mandatory notiﬁ  cation 
of zoonoses in wildlife.
Th   e National Environment Act (CAP 153) empowered 
the local environment committees in districts to report 
any events or activities which had or were likely to have 
signiﬁ  cant impacts on the environment to the District 
Environment Oﬃ   cer.  Th  ere was, however, a need to 
create mechanisms to ensure that events with public 
health implications were reported to the District Health 
Oﬃ   cer and eventually to the IHR NFP.
Th  e Atomic Energy Act of 2008 (CAP 143) provided 
guidance on the utilization of atomic energy for socio-
economic development and ensured that safety standards 
were upheld through regular inspections of radio-nuclear 
facilities by the Atomic Energy Council. Th  e  legislation, 
however, did not provide for mandatory notiﬁ  cation of 
accidents, leakage or theft of radioactive sources at radio-
nuclear facilities.
Th   e National Food and Drugs Act (CAP 278) provided 
for the notiﬁ   cation of cases of food poisoning to the 
District Health Oﬃ     cer and the withdrawal of 
contaminated foods from the shelves.
Coordination and National Focal Point (NFP) 
communications
IHR coordination
Th  e coordination of emergencies was a mandate of the 
Oﬃ   ce of the Prime Minister (OPM) and was executed by 
a multi-sectoral Disaster Preparedness and Management 
committee. Th  ere was no disaster management policy 
and strategic plan addressing the IHR(2005) multi-
hazards approach. Public health emergencies were, 
however, coordinated by a multi-sectoral National Task 
Force that is chaired by the Ministry of Health. Th  e 
frequency of the meetings was determined by the 
presence and nature of a disease outbreak or public 
health emergency. At the district level, the corresponding 
structures for coordination of disasters and public health 
emergencies were the District Disaster Management 
Committee (DDMC) and the District Epidemic Prepared-
ness and Response committees, respectively. Th  ese  were 
functional in 92% (12/13) of the districts, but they only 
met when there was an emergency.
NFP communications and operations
Th   ere was a designated IHR NFP that was located in the 
National Surveillance Unit in the Ministry of Health. 
Communications from the IHR NFP were done within 
the IDSR context and were limited to the health sector at 
the time of this assessment. Operational communication 
was therefore lacking between the IHR NFP and the 
other IHR stakeholders located outside the health sector. 
Th   ere were no designated sectoral IHR Focal Points (FPs) 
to facilitate communications with the IHR NFP in 
prevent  ing and responding to zoonotic, foodborne, 
chemical and radio-nuclear hazards. However, the IHR 
NFP monitored events at the international level through 
the WHO event information site. Th  ree  epidemiologists 
in the IHR NFP had access to the site and received e-mail 
alerts of events notiﬁ  ed by other countries to the WHO.
Th   e IHR NFP was mandated to provide technical and 
logistical support to district rapid response teams to 
conduct the initial health risk assessment and to initiate 
public health responses during public health emer  gencies. 
Further  more, the IHR NFP was the national authority 
responsible for notiﬁ   cation of PH emergencies to the 
WHO. However, systematic use of the decision instru-
ment (Annex 2 of the IHR[2005]) to guide notiﬁ  cation by 
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public health emergency, pandemic inﬂ  uenza  (H1N1), 
had been notiﬁ  ed by the IHR NFP to the WHO IHR FP 
within the 12 months preceding the assessment.
National advocacy for the IHR(2005)
A sensitisation workshop of key stakeholders on the 
IHR(2005) had been conducted at the national level by 
the IHR NFP. However, sub-national sensitisations had 
not been undertaken and a committee relevant to 
IHR(2005) implementation had not been established. 
Similarly, information packages on the IHR(2005) for 
diﬀ  erent target groups and the IHR webpage had not 
been instituted. At the district level, none of the districts 
visited had undertaken activities to increase IHR(2005) 
awareness. Similarly, the IHR information packages were 
not available in all the districts for distribution to the 
health facilities.
Capacities for public health surveillance
Detection
Uganda was using the IDSR strategy to conduct surveil-
lance and initiate interventions for the control of 
infectious and zoonotic diseases in the general popu-
lation. Th  e national list of priority conditions was 
limited to the list of IDSR priority conditions, and hence 
did not include SARS, inﬂ  uenza caused by a new sub-
type, smallpox, or chemical, radiological, and nuclear 
hazards.
All the districts (13/13) visited had designated public 
health surveillance oﬃ     ces, most had IDSR technical 
guidelines (92%, or 12/13), and all (13/13) had case deﬁ  -
ni  tions for guidance in case detection of infectious and 
zoonotic diseases. However, only 57% (35/61) and 66% 
(40/61) of the health facilities had IDSR technical guide-
lines and case deﬁ  nitions, respectively, for infectious and 
zoonotic diseases surveillance (Figure 1). Th  e  surveillance 
guidelines and case deﬁ   nitions on SARS, smallpox, 
radiological, nuclear and foodborne hazards were lacking 
at all levels.
Reporting
Standardized patient registers and report forms were 
used to collect and report data on infectious and zoonotic 
events at the health facility level. Th  e forms, however, 
lacked provision for reporting several IHR priority 
diseases and hazards. Th   e immediate and weekly report-
ing of infectious and zoonotic events in humans were 
largely communicated to the district and national levels 
by telephone and Short Message Service (SMS) (77%, or 
10/13), and to a lesser extent by e-mail and radio call. Th  e 
National Surveillance Unit, the designated IHR NFP, 
received the surveillance reports from the districts. Th  e 
average completeness and timeliness of weekly reporting 
were assessed for the four weeks preceding the interview. 
During the period from 31 August to 27 September 2009, 
the average completeness and timeliness for weekly 
public health surveillance reporting from the district to 
the national level was 83% (range 46-100%) and 68% 
(range 44-100%), respectively. During the same period, 
the average completeness and timeliness of weekly public 
health surveillance reporting from the health facility to 
district level was 88% (range 52-100%) and 73% (range 
48-100%), respectively (Figure 2).
Data management
Th  e data received at the national level underwent 
veriﬁ  cation and analysis and was thereafter compiled into 
a weekly epidemiological newsletter for disseminated to 
all the IDSR stakeholders. All the districts had the 
capacity to systematically analyze data in terms of person, 
time and place using either Microsoft Excel, Epi Info™ or 
paper-based manual analysis. However, only 62% (38/61) 
of the health facilities had the capacity to systematically 
Figure 1. Presence of Public Health Surveillance Offi   ces, 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response Guidelines, and 
Case Defi  nitions for Infectious Disease Surveillance, Uganda, 
2009.
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Figure 2. Completeness and Timeliness of Weekly Public Health 
Surveillance Reporting, District and Health Facility Levels, 
Uganda, 2009.
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majority, 69% (9/13), of the districts reported the availa-
bility of a computerized system to analyze epidemio  logic 
data. On the contrary, only 16% (10/61) of the health 
facilities reported the availability of a computerized 
system to analyze epidemiologic data.
Supervision and feedback
Supervisory visits by the MoH to the districts were few 
and inconsistent. Only 15% (2/13) of the districts 
beneﬁ  ted from the supervision of surveillance activities 
by the MoH in the six months that preceded the assess-
ment. Th  e dissemination of the weekly epidemiologic 
data was done through weekly newsletters, publication of 
the data in the newspapers, e-mail, and the monthly 
IDSR meetings.
Cross-border and international surveillance
Cross-border surveillance activities like screening, 
isolation, quarantine and provision of information were 
under  taken in response to the SARS outbreak in 2003 
and pandemic inﬂ   uenza (H1N1) in 2009. Th  e cross-
border activities were therefore not routine and barely 
lasted beyond the prevailing public health threat. 
However, there were periodic joint cross-border planning 
and simulation exercises for pandemic inﬂ  uenza under 
the East African Community (EAC) Secretariat and these 
could be used to strengthen the IHR(2005) cross-border 
surveillance capacities as well.
Capacities for public health response
National and district rapid response teams (RRT) were 
functional, but their composition did not meet the 
expertise required for the multi-hazards approach of the 
IHR(2005). National clinical guidelines for case manage-
ment of common infections and zoonoses were found in 
all the districts and in 52% (32/61) of the health facilities. 
Th   e guidelines, however, lacked procedures for manage-
ment of chemical and radio-nuclear events. National and 
district emergency teams, including health care workers 
at health facility level, had been trained in the 
management of emergencies due to common infectious 
and zoonotic hazards. Corresponding training for 
manag  ing chemical and radio-nuclear hazards had not 
been undertaken. Projects like Making Medical Injections 
Safe (MMIS) and other district-based programs were 
vital in building infection control capacity in the districts, 
but the country lacked an in-service infection control 
training program. Medical isolation wards were lacking 
in all the health facilities visited since they were not 
included in the standard MoH health facility building 
plans. Similarly, public health decontamination capabili-
ties for chemical and radio-nuclear hazards were lacking 
at the national and district levels.
Capacities for public health preparedness
Th  ere were disease-speciﬁ  c national preparedness plans 
for pandemic inﬂ  uenza, malaria, hepatitis E virus and 
cholera. Th  e country, however, lacked a comprehensive 
plan incorporating the all-hazards approach of the 
IHR(2005). About half (54%) of the districts had 
preparedness plans, but these also lacked the all-hazards 
approach of the IHR(2005). Th  e MoH had a roster of 
experts for supporting infectious hazards response, but it 
lacked food safety, chemical and radio-nuclear experts.
An assessment of public health emergency needs had 
not been undertaken at the national level or in 77% 
(10/13) of the districts visited. Nonetheless, the MoH had 
a national stockpile that included drugs like Tamiﬂ  u, 
meningitis vaccines and personal protective equipment 
(PPEs).
Capacities for risk communication
Th  ere was a designated unit in the MoH for risk 
communication during PH emergencies. Th   e head of the 
unit was the designated spokesperson for the MoH 
emergencies. Similarly, all (13/13) of the districts had 
focal point oﬃ     cers that serve as spokespersons for 
coordinating risk communication during emergencies. 
Th  ough the roles, responsibilities and procedures for 
coordination of risk communication stakeholders were 
well articulated as part of institutional memory, national 
guidelines on risk communication were lacking to backup 
the information.
Th  e MoH had a website which was accessible to the 
media and public for information dissemination, though 
it was not regularly updated. Furthermore, the country-
wide network of FM radio stations and Village Health 
Teams oﬀ  ered vital media for disseminating health messages 
and educating communities. Community messages and 
materials for the common epidemic diseases (e.g. cholera, 
meningitis, polio, measles, avian inﬂ  uenza [H5N1] and 
pan demic  inﬂ  uenza [H1N1]) were available at the national 
level. However, the development of risk communication 
plans and the mass production of the materials were 
almost always done during the epidemic season. Th  is 
therefore usually resulted in risk communication 
materials not being readily available when outbreaks 
started. In addition, the scope of the messages fell short 
of the IHR(2005) all-hazards approach.
Human resources
An assessment of human resource capacities and corres-
ponding training needs in light of the IHR(2005) multi-
hazards approach had not been undertaken. Th  ere  were 
at least 17 health training institutions in the country for 
training public health specialists/epidemiologists, clinical 
medicine specialists, medical doctors, clinical oﬃ   cers, 
nurses and other paramedical professions. However, 
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diploma holders like the district public health surveil-
lance oﬃ   cers and laboratory focal persons, yet they are at 
the centre of coordinating district surveillance and 
response activities.
Laboratory capacities
National capacity to deliver laboratory services for all 
hazards
Th  e national laboratory policy of 2009 provided for the 
designation of a national laboratory coordinating oﬃ   ce in 
the MoH and the deﬁ  nition of roles and responsibilities 
of laboratories at national, regional and district levels 
with regards to infectious and zoonotic investigations. A 
ﬁ   ve-year strategic plan for strengthening national 
laboratory services was being drafted by the MoH and 
health partners. Th   e laboratory standard operating 
proce  dures (SOPs) for infectious and zoonotic diseases 
were available at the national level. Most (77%, or 10/13) 
of the districts had the laboratory SOPs for infectious and 
zoonotic diseases. Similarly, most (77%, or 10/13) of the 
districts had conducted an inventory of laboratory 
capacity for the various health facility laboratories. 
However, only 54% (7/13) of the districts had operational 
plans to strengthen laboratory services and only 46% 
(6/13) of the districts reported that the plans were being 
implemented. Only 39% (5/13) of the districts had a plan 
for continuing professional development of laboratory 
staﬀ   (Figure 3).
At the health facility level, only 36% (22/61) had 
laboratory SOPs while only 26% (16/61) had conducted an 
inventory of their laboratory capacity. A paltry 13% (8/61) 
of health facilities had adequate specimen collection/
transport materials for routine investigations while 20% 
(12/61) and 15% (9/61) had adequate lab reagents and 
adequate lab equipment, respectively. Only 20% (12/61) 
of the health facilities had adequate staﬀ   according to 
national minimum staﬃ   ng levels (Figure 4).
Confi  rmation
Th  ere was national capacity to conﬁ  rm priority condi-
tions, namely malaria, Human Immunodeﬁ  ciency Virus 
(HIV), tuberculosis (TB), polio, measles, inﬂ  uenza, 
cholera, Ebola, Marburg, meningococcal meningitis, 
trypano  somiasis, plague, and yellow fever. In addition, 
there was a government analytical laboratory with 
capacity to investigate chemical hazards. However, the 
country lacked laboratory capacity for investigating 
radio-nuclear events.
Laboratory networking
Th   ere was a national laboratory network that functioned 
through exchange of specimens, data/results, provision 
of reagents, conducting support supervision and 
conducting external quality assessments (EQA). Th  e  list 
of designated national reference laboratories was avail-
able at the national level and had been disseminated to all 
levels. Th   e list of international collaborating labora  tories 
for investigating infectious and zoonotic events was 
available and included the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia (USA), the 
National Institute of Communicable Diseases (NICD) in 
South Africa, and the Kenya Medical Research Institute 
(KEMRI) in Kenya. However, the list of inter  national 
reference laboratories for radio-nuclear investi  gations 
was not available.
Specimen collection and transport
Th   ere were multiple program-based systems for collect-
ing and transporting specimens to the laboratory. Th  ese 
included the expanded program on immunisation (EPI) 
system for measles and polio specimens; the inﬂ  uenza 
sentinel surveillance specimen referral to the National 
Inﬂ  uenza Centre (NIC); and the postal bus system for 
sending dry blood spots for early infant diagnosis of HIV. 
In that regard, 85% (11/13) of districts and 29% (19/65) of 
health facilities reported having emergency specimen 
collection kits. However, only 46% (6/13) of the districts 
Figure 3. Measures of Capacity for Laboratory Surveillance, 
District Level, Uganda, 2009 (Districts sampled 16% (13/80)).
77%               77%
54% 46% 39%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Laboratory
Standard
Operating
Procedures
Laboratory
inventory
Existance of
Laboratory
plans
Implemented
laboratory
plans
Continuing
Medical
Education 
Measures of Capacity
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
Figure 1. Measures of Laboratory Public Health Surveillance 
Capacity, Health-facility Level, Uganda, 2010 (Sampled health 
facilities (n= 61)).
36%
26%
13%
20%
15%
20%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Standard
Operating
Procedures
Laboratory
inventory
Specimen
collection
kits
Adequate
reagents
Adequate
equipment
Adequate
staff
Measures of Capacity
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
Wamala et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10(Suppl 1):S9 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S9
Page 6 of 10and 15% (10/65) of health facilities had transport media 
while 69% (9/13) of districts and 43% (28/65) of the 
health facilities had specimen transport carrier boxes.
International air courier services were operating in the 
country with memoranda of understanding and export 
permits signed to ship biological specimens. Th  e triple 
packaging materials were available at the national level 
and at least three staﬀ   working with the national refer-
ence laboratories were certiﬁ   ed by International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) for safe shipment of bio-
logical specimens. Th  ere were, however, no national 
guide  lines to streamline the referral of biological samples 
to reference international collaborating laboratories.
Biosafety and laboratory biosecurity
Despite the absence of a national laboratory biosafety 
committee, the corresponding guidelines had been 
developed and disseminated to the districts. Th  e  majority 
of the districts (62%, or 8/13) and a few of the health 
facilities (22%, or 14/65) reported having copies of the 
national biosafety SOPs. Th  e country had one high-
containment biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratory and one 
BSL2+ laboratory, both in the Uganda Virus Research 
Institute (UVRI).
Laboratory quality assurance
Despite the absence of a national laboratory accreditation 
system, there were four internationally accredited WHO 
reference laboratories for investigating polio, inﬂ  uenza, 
plague and tuberculosis. National External Quality 
Assur  ance (EQA) schemes using panel testing for HIV, 
TB and malaria were available. Most of the districts (85%, 
or 11/13) and about half (49%, or 32/65) of the health 
facilities reported having a laboratory participating in at 
least one national EQA scheme. Similarly, the national 
reference laboratories were participating in international 
EQA schemes.
Laboratory-based surveillance
Standardised tools for collecting and reporting laboratory 
data were available at the national level. Most of the 
districts (85%, or 11/13) and 52% (34/65) of the health 
facilities had the laboratory reporting forms. However, 
since there was no system for relaying the reports from 
the district to the national level, the reporting was largely 
inconsistent, incomplete and not timely. An electronic 
database existed at the national level and was used for 
storing and analysing the data.
Participation in public health emergencies
Th  e national laboratory services unit reported partici-
pating fully in responding to public health emergencies 
as a member of the National Task Force, national RRT 
and the IDSR committee.
Capacities for designated points of entry (PoE)
Th   e country had one international airport (Entebbe), one 
international port (Port Bell) and several ground crossing 
points. Uganda had not designated any PoE for the 
implementation of the IHR(2005) by the time we 
conducted the assessment. Th   ere were no provisions for 
the application of the following IHR documents at all the 
points of entry: the International Certiﬁ  cate of Vaccina-
tion or prophylaxis; the pertinent health section of the 
Aircraft General Declaration; the Ship Sanitation Control 
Certiﬁ   cate/Ship Sanitation Control Exemption 
Certiﬁ  cate; or the maritime declaration of health. Public 
health emergency contingency response plans were 
lacking at all the PoE since there were no permanent 
public health authorities.
Discussion
National legislation for the IHR(2005)
Th  e IHR(2005) mandates each country to fully comply 
with the obligations therein, but it does not require 
countries to adopt or revise domestic legislation, pro-
vided that they comply with their obligations. Th  at 
notwithstanding, an adequate legal framework to support 
and enable all the varied IHR(2005) activities is needed in 
each country [11]. Th   e revision of national legislation or 
other instruments should therefore be considered to 
facilitate full and eﬃ     cient implementation of the 
IHR(2005). In this regard, Uganda undertook a process of 
identifying the relevant national legislation for IHR(2005) 
implementation. In response to the legal challenges 
posed in responding to the SARS outbreak in 2003 and 
the IHR(2005) requirements, countries like Hong Kong 
revised their infectious disease legislation to facilitate 
response to public health threats in a timely manner [12]. 
Niger also amended national legislation to include 
IHR(2005).
Th   e national legislation in Uganda should be reviewed 
to facilitate the attainment of the IHR(2005) core capacity 
requirements.
Coordination and IHR NFP communications
Th  e presence of a national framework for disaster 
manage  ment is critical for the prevention and manage-
ment of public health emergencies. Th  e assessment 
revealed that this framework existed with the Oﬃ   ce of 
the Prime Minister, which had the national mandate for 
managing disasters, including public health emergencies, 
in collaboration with the sector- and district-based 
emergency teams. However, there is need for a disaster 
management policy and strategic plan that addresses the 
IHR(2005) multi-hazards approach for managing public 
health risks and hazards.
Article 4 of the IHR(2005) mandates countries to 
designate IHR NFPs for coordination of IHR(2005) 
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Surveillance Unit in the Ministry of Health as the IHR 
NFP. Th   e scope of activities and operational communica-
tion by the IHR NFP was suboptimal, limited to the IDSR 
strategy for communicable disease control, and excluded 
PoE. Since partnerships and intersectoral collaboration 
are essential to IHR(2005) implementation, IHR focal 
point oﬃ     ces in all the relevant sectors need to be 
designated to facilitate the establishment of core capacities 
in line with the IHR(2005) multi-hazards approach.
Additionally, advocacy for the IHR(2005) needs to be 
prioritized in the country to ensure that all the relevant 
stakeholders are aware of their obligations and for the 
mobilisation of the resources required to conduct assess-
ments and to establish and maintain the core capacities 
for the IHR(2005).
Capacities for public health surveillance
Article 5 of the IHR(2005) mandates countries to develop 
and maintain the capacities to detect, assess, notify and 
report public health events [5]. In Uganda, the IDSR 
strategy oﬀ   ers a good framework for launching the 
IHR(2005) implementation given the promising reporting 
indices. However, the priority diseases list, surveillance 
guide  lines, case deﬁ  nitions and reporting tools have to be 
updated to incorporate all the IHR(2005) priority 
diseases and hazards. Th  e revised tools and guidelines 
should then be disseminated for use by all IHR 
stakeholders including districts and health facilities since 
the assessment revealed shortage of surveillance tools 
and guidelines, especially at the peripheral levels. Cross-
border surveillance activities were reactive and only 
undertaken when there was an ongoing public health risk 
or hazard. Designation of points of entry for routine 
implementation of cross-border surveillance activities 
needs to be undertaken. Article 44 of the IHR(2005) 
provides for collaboration between countries in develop-
ing and maintaining public health capacities [5]. In light 
of this, the East African Community (EAC) Secretariat 
initiatives on pandemic inﬂ   uenza prepared  ness and 
response should be exploited to strengthen the IHR(2005) 
core capacities as well.
Capacities for public health response
Article 13 of the IHR(2005) mandates countries to 
develop, strengthen and maintain the capacity to respond 
promptly and eﬀ  ectively to public health risks and public 
health emergencies of international concern as set out in 
Annex 1 of the regulations [5]. Following the numerous 
outbreaks of Ebola in 2000 [13] and 2007 [14], Uganda 
has accumulated a wealth of experience and expertise for 
infectious and zoonotic disease response. To this end, 
there were trained national and district rapid response 
teams as well as national clinical guidelines for managing 
infectious and zoonotic disease in the country. However, 
the membership of the rapid response teams and the 
content of the outbreak response guidelines needs to be 
updated to incorporate the IHR(2005) multi-hazards 
approach.
Capacities for public health preparedness
Preparedness planning is critical to ensuring that a 
successful response is mounted in the event of a public 
health emergency. Uganda had a series of disease speciﬁ  c 
preparedness plans for responding to the recurrent 
outbreaks of cholera, meningitis, malaria, hepatitis E 
virus and inﬂ  uenza. However, a comprehensive national 
plan incorporating the IHR(2005) all-hazards approach 
has to be developed and replicated at district and 
peripheral levels. Th  is should go along with building 
adequate human resources surge capacity and stockpiles 
of supplies for emergency response to the IHR(2005) 
hazards.
Laboratory capacities
Annex 1 of the IHR(2005) requires that countries estab-
lish capacities for conducting a comprehensive health 
risk assessment in response to public health events [5]. 
Laboratory investigations are central to a comprehensive 
health risk assessment. Uganda had a laboratory policy 
that was launched in 2009, and a corresponding labora-
tory strategic plan was being drafted. It is therefore 
crucial that the plan provides for the creation of a 
national biosafety committee, a materials/specimens trans-
fer (referral) policy, a national laboratory accredi  tation 
system, and improve the performance of the laboratory 
information system. Correspondingly though, the 
national laboratory SOPs were available at the national 
level, however, critical shortages of labora  tory SOPs, 
reagents, equipment and staﬃ   ng were ob  served in the 
districts. Th  e shortages in laboratory reagents were 
mainly attributed to poor stock manage  ment and hence 
the need to improve stock manage  ment skills and 
eliminate supply chain bottlenecks.
Confi  rmation capacity
Th  e capacities for laboratory investigation of the IHR 
priority hazards were available except for smallpox and 
radio-nuclear hazards. In the short term, these gaps 
could be addressed by identifying a list of international 
collaborating laboratories that can be readily contacted 
in the event of a hazard requiring their competencies.
Other laboratory capacities
Several independent and program-based systems for 
trans  porting polio, measles, inﬂ   uenza and HIV speci-
mens existed in the country. Th  e challenge however, is 
the need to develop an integrated and cost eﬀ  ective 
Wamala et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10(Suppl 1):S9 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S9
Page 8 of 10national system to ease the transport of all specimens 
from the peripheral level to the national level and ensure 
that the emergency specimen collection kits are available, 
especially at the peripheral level. National guidelines for 
material transfer agreements are required to streamline 
shipping specimens out of the country.
Capacities at points of entry
Th   e IHR(2005) requires countries to identify and desig-
nate PoE for the implementation of measures under 
Annex 1b [5]. Th  e measures are critical for preventing 
and controlling international spread of diseases. It is 
there  fore imperative that Uganda designates PoE for the 
implementation of the IHR(2005) core capacity require-
ments and builds their capacity for this purpose.
Conclusions
Th  e assessment highlighted critical gaps to guide the 
IHR(2005) planning process. Th   e IHR(2005) action plan 
should therefore be developed to foster improved 
national and international public health security. Th  is 
should incorporate the above proposed solutions to the 
gaps identiﬁ   ed with special attention to the recom-
mendations below that are key for smooth implemen-
tation of the plan.
Recommendations
A multisectoral taskforce should be constituted to 
oversee the amendment of the national laws that are 
relevant for the IHR(2005). Focal point oﬃ   ces for the 
IHR should be designated to in all the sectors relevant to 
the IHR(2005) to facilitate eﬃ   cient communication with 
the IHR NFP.
Th  e national priority diseases list, surveillance guide-
lines, case deﬁ   nitions and reporting tools should be 
updated to incorporate the IHR(2005). Th  e roster of 
experts for the national rapid response team and the 
content of the outbreak response and risk communication 
guidelines should be updated to incorporate the 
IHR(2005).
A national preparedness plan that incorporates the 
IHR(2005) should be developed. Th  e national strategic 
plan for laboratory services that is being drafted should 
address the critical gaps identiﬁ  ed, including the estab-
lish  ment of a national laboratory accreditation system; 
the establishment of a national biosafety committee; and 
the development of guidelines and a national system for 
specimen referral, both within and outside the country. 
Th   e PoE for IHR(2005) implemen  tation should be identi-
ﬁ  ed and designated.
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